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Abstract. This paper discusses how hot carrier in-
jection (HCI) can be exploited to create a trojan that
will cause hardware failures. The trojan is produced
not via additional logic circuitry but by controlled
scenarios that maximize and accelerate the HCI
effect in transistors. These scenarios range from
manipulating the manufacturing process to varying
the internal voltage distribution. This new type of
trojan is difficult to test due to its gradual hardware
degradation mechanism. This paper describes the
HCI effect, detection techniques and discusses the
possibility for maliciously induced HCI trojans.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the capital costs of building and main-
taining fabrication facilities, the number of fabs is
shrinking. Hence, there has been a major shift in
control over the fabrication process for integrated
circuits, IC. More and more vendors outsource the
fabrication process to off shore fabrication facili-
ties [1]. Using such facilities makes the integrated
circuits vulnerable to malicious alterations. These
alterations are more commonly known as hardware
trojans and are usually created by insertion of addi-
tional logic circuitry [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. The
goal of these trojans ranges from functional changes
of the circuit to a complete system failure.
A new type of trojan that avoids the use of addi-
tional logic circuitry can still be induced by exploit-
ing the principles of semiconductor physics. One
such trojan maximizes and accelerates the effects
of Hot Carrier Injection (HCI). HCI is a mechanism
that degrades the physical characteristic of a tran-
sistor, resulting in slower switching times or break
down. The HCI is just one of the wearing mecha-
nisms that are responsible for transistor degradation.
An HCI trojan can be manifested through process
variations during fabrication or changes in voltage
distribution during operation.
The scaling of process technology has increased
the effect of HCI on CMOS degradation. As a result,
the operational life time of CMOS devices has been
decreasing. Integrated circuit manufacturers have
been addressing this problem with various process
and design techniques. Fabs test for HCI during
initial process characterization, but generally do
not test during wafer production. However, due to
the outsourcing shift in manufacturing, safeguards
against HCI become vulnerable. This can result in
undetected malicious HCI trojan.
This paper is organized as follows: In section
two, HCI mechanism is described. In section three,
detection techniques for HCI is discussed. Finally,
in section four, different methods are explored for
introducing HCI trojans.
HCI DESCRIPTION
The term “hot carrier injection” refers to carriers
that have gained high enough kinetic energy due
to intense electric fields and are injected into the
gate oxide of the CMOS device. The degradation
associated with HCI refers to the physical break-
down and characteristic distortion of the device. The
operational conditions and the toggling frequency of
the CMOS transistor are direct contributors to the
HCI rate [8].
There are four known mechanism for Hot Carrier
Injection, that describe the conditions for carriers
to enter the gate oxide: SHE, CHE, DAHC, SSHE.
The effects of HCI are more prominent in NMOS
devices compared to the PMOS devices. It requires
3.3eV for electrons to overcome the surface energy
barrier at the Si–SiO2 interface and get injected into
the oxide, compared to 4.6eV for holes. This paper
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will concentrate on three HCI effects in NMOS
devices.
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Fig. 1. Silicon Lattice interface at the gate oxide
The most physically destructive HCI mechanism
is Drain Avalanche Hot Carrier (DAHC) injection.
This type of carrier injection occurs when the drain
voltage, Vd, is much greater then the gate voltage,
Vg (worse case Vd = 2Vg). Such conditions create
a very high electric field near the drain region.
This high electric field accelerates the carriers into
the drain depletion region. The high rate of ac-
celeration propels the carriers to collide with Si
lattice atoms and through impact ionization, create
displaced electron-hole pairs, shown by the yellow
region in Figure 2. The majority of the generated
holes are usually absorbed by the substrate and thus
increases the substrate current, Isub. Some of the
generated electrons proceed to the drain and result
in increased drain current, Id. However, some of
the electron - hole pairs gain enough energy to
breach the Si–SiO2 interface energy barrier, 3.3eV
for electrons and 4.6eV for holes.
Once, the carriers have passed the energy barrier
of the Si–SiO2, they can either be trapped at the
Si–SiO2 interface, within the oxide itself or become
gate current, Ig. After the bulk silicon has been
cleaved and the exposed silicon bonds have been
passivated, during the manufacturing process, Si–H
bonds are formed, shown in Figure1. Carriers with
enough energy, ≥ 0.3eV , can break these weak Si–
H bonds and get trapped, forming a space charge.
Over time, as more and more carriers are trapped,
there is an increase in threshold voltage, Vt, and
a change in conveyed conductance, gm for NMOS
transistors. These changes in device characteristics
result in decrease performance and eventual device
failure.
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Fig. 2. HCI effects: SHE (|Vsub| >> 0), CHE (Vd = Vg), DAHC
(Vd = 2Vg)
Substrate hot electron, SHE, injection occurs
when the substrate voltage is different than zero
volts, |Vsub| >> 0. Under this condition, an elec-
trical field from the substrate drives the carriers
in the channel upward towards the gate, as shown
in Figure 2. As the carriers move closer to the
substrate-oxide interface, they are influenced by
high electrical field in the surface depletion region,
which accelerates the carriers and raises their kinetic
energy. If the carriers reach high enough energy,
greater then 3.3eV , they will breach the energy
barrier of the Si–SiO2 interface and behave exactly
as the carriers in the DAHC scenario.
Channel hot electron, CHE, injection occurs when
the drain voltage, Vd, is equal to the gate voltage,
Vg, Vd = Vg, and both voltages are higher then the
source voltage, Vs. Under this condition, the electric
field may propel some of the carriers into the gate
oxide before they reach the drain depletion region,
as shown in Figure 2. The behavior is exactly the
same as in DAHC and SHE scenarios. CHE and
SHE do not physically damage the Si lattice atoms
during its injection mechanisms, while DAHC is
very destructive to the drain depletion region. Figure
3 shows the DAHC and CHE effects on a CMOS
inverter.
The static (DC) conditions for drain the, Vd, and
substrate, Vsub, voltages leading to the DAHC and
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Fig. 3. Dynamic HCI effects on a cmos inverter
the SHE mechanisms are minimized through the
transistor design process. However, the CHE and
DAHC injection mechanisms do occur during the
normal dynamic (AC) transistor switching operation
as shown in Figure 5. Thus, switching frequency
as well as voltage conditions determine the rate
of HCI in a transistor. The normal design and
manufacturing process are optimized for to produce
a transistor operational lifetime of greater then 10
years.
To combat the problem of gate oxide degrada-
tion, some manufacturing processes, ≥ 40nm, use
nitrous oxide, N2O, or nitric oxide, NO, during
the oxidation process [9], [10]. By optimizing con-
centration of nitrate of the interface layer, the trap
density is reduced.For a given process, there is an
acceptable range of nitrate that can be used that
decreases the HCI effects and avoids changing the
performance of the CMOS device. Concentrations
of nitrogen above the acceptable range will lead to
gate oxide breakdown. In summary, the HCI rate is
optimized by manufacturing process and transistor
design.
HCI DETECTION
There are detection techniques in place to test the
influence of HCI in an integrated circuit, IC. HCI
has many different symptoms: change in substrate
current, Isub, change in the drain current, Id, change
in the gate current, Ig, change in the threshold volt-
age, Vt, and change in conveyed conductance, gm.
For a packaged circuit, some of these symptoms are
hard to diagnose. Thus, most detection techniques
test for known indicators (IDD, IDDQ, Vt, access
time, propagation delay, ...) that are attributed to
HCI.
One detection techniques is a canary mechanism
based on delay monitoring [11], [12], [13], [14].
This technique employs an additional circuit that
compares the propagated delay of a transistor or
any number of devices to a pre-determined stored
value. As the transistor ages, the compared values
are adjusted. A flag is raised when the propagation
delay of a transistor is greater then expected. This
method assumes that the test circuit does not age,
since it performs periodic testing and therefore not
under heavy usage. The main drawback of such
method of detection is inability to distinguish the
cause of the changing propagation delay, since there
are other phenomena that effect transistor delay.
Ring oscillators are another method for monitor-
ing transistor degradation. [15], [16] This technique
can be utilized on the wafer level, in conjunction
with a canary mechanism or an external monitoring
probe.
Design techniques employ device reliability and
lifetime prediction models, that result in design pa-
rameter guard-banding. [17], [18], [19] However the
resulting guard-band can be inadequate to accom-
modate parameter variability induced by varying
environmental and manufacturing conditions. Other,
design techniques, such as obfuscation [20], hide
the design but also fail in HCI detection since HCI
affects the transistor and not the circuit layout. Self-
calibration design[21], [22] techniques can be used
to alter the clock or supply voltage in response to
monitored transistor degradation.
In addition, there are wafer level [23] and pack-
age level reliability monitoring techniques, as well
as parameter prognostic techniques [24] that have
been developed to detect HCI transistor degradation.
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Fig. 4. Package-level diagnostic test
Prognostic measures can be applied at the system
level to detect trends of precursors to HCI induced
failure. Furthermore, there are fast wafer level reli-
ability monitor techniques that have been recently
proposed [25].
One packaged device level detection techniques
varies the environmental operating conditions to de-
tect the presence of HCI failure mechanism. Figure
4 demonstrates the process:
I. Test for selected parameters to insure the test
devices functionality.
II. Devices are placed in an environment is set
to -55◦C and supply voltage (Vdd) is set to
maximum or 24 hours.
III. Ramp devices back to room temperature, 25◦C.
IV. Test for selected parameters.
V. If the device is still functional from step V then
repeat II, III, IV for a minimum of a 160 hours
to a maximum of 240 hours.
VI. Test for selected parameters and if there is a
significant change this suggests HCI failure.
VII. Perform unbiased bake at 250◦C for 24 hours.
VIII. Test at room temperature, if full or partial re-
covery in the monitored parameters is achieved
then the failure was due to the HCI effects.
The test results show the resilience of a device to
the HCI effect. Drawbacks to such a test technique
are its destructive nature and the length of the test
procedure. This test technique does not provide the
reason (design process, manufacturing process, etc.)
for the HCI induced failures.
HCI TROJAN
Two ways an HCI trojan could be introduced into
an integrated circuit (IC), are through the design
process or the manufacturing process. The purpose
is to maliciously modify transistors that will cause
the IC to fail prematurely by utilizing the HCI
effect.
As described in Section 2, there are manufac-
turing processes that minimize the effect of HCI.
Without knowledge of the circuit design, a hacker
can distort the variation of nitrate concentration to
create a wafer with minimal HCI resilience. The
distortion of the nitrate process will influence the
lifetime of the device produced from that wafer. The
annealing time or the temperature used during the
nitrate layering process can also be used to vary the
resilience to HCI [9],[26].
The hacker can also create “infected” transistors
at the design level. There are several voltage con-
ditions for a transistor that create HCI mechanisms,
they are described in section 2. The hacker can alter
the voltage supply to a particular transistor or an
array of transistors to create optimal conditions for
HCI. For example, the conditions to induce DAHC,
(Vd = 2Vg), during static or dynamic transistor
operation. This method is very attractive to the
hacker, because he can target a specific area of the
chip to accelerate the HCI effect.
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Fig. 5. HCI effects on SRAM
The manufacturing process variations, such as
nitrate distortion, can be coupled with the design
changes, such as variations in voltage distribution,
for a cumulative HCI effect. The cumulative effect
will drive the infected transistors to wear even
faster. This allows the hacker to isolate the most
critical transistors in order to produce maximum
effect for the malicious attack with minimum circuit
alteration.
For a example in a case of a processor, the hacker
can modify the cache memory module because the
cache is heavy utilized and it is not protected by
error correction (ECC) [27].
In a six transistor SRAM cell which can be
used in the cache, the passthrough transistor is a
perfect candidate for infection by the hacker. The
passthrough transistor, seen in Figure 5, experiences
heavy stress under high frequency of access. The
red arrow in Figure 5 shows the current flow.
An infected passthrough transistor (PS) will wear
much faster then the rest of the SRAM cell. After
some time of operation, the passthrough transistor
will have a very high threshold voltage, Vt due
to HCI. If the gate voltage, Vg, is not sufficient
compared to the threshold voltage, the transistor
fails to function. At this point, the passthrough
transistor will not let a new value be written in
during a write operation. Such device failures can
lead to catastrophic results. In addition, the hacker
can apply software techniques to further accelerate
the process by increasing the writing frequency of
the infected cell. The gradual degradation of the
infected HCI transistors demonstrates a malicious
attack, similar to a time-bomb mechanism, that is
difficult to detect.
CONCLUSION
This paper discussed the concept of a new type of
trojan that exploits HCI effect in transistors. There
are no detection techniques that can detect all the
variations of the HCI trojans in CMOS devices. In
any post-production tests the infected transistor are
operating just as well as normal transistors with
no discrepancy in performance. The danger lies in
the fact that until the trojan transistor has been in
operation for some time, the circuit appears as if
no malicious alterations have been inserted. The
relationship between HCI effect and switching us-
age of a transistor, makes the trojan HCI transistors
incredibly dangerous. There is a critical demand for
detection techniques that can properly identify HCI
trojans.
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